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SYMPOSIUM:

THE NEW MEXICO EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENTASSESSING ITS IMPACT
THE NEW MEXICO EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
LEO KANOWITZt

In November, 1972, New Mexico voters will be asked to
approve or disapprove an amendment to Article II, section 18 of
the state constitution, which would, in express terms, prohibit
discrimination based on sex. Specifically the amendment would
add to the due process and equal protection guarantees of that
section the following language: "Equality of rights under law
shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person." If
approved by the New Mexico electorate, the amendment will
become effective on July 1, 1973.
At the same time, a proposed amendment to the United States
Constitution will in all likelihood still be making its way through
the ratification process. That federal constitutional amendment-if approved by three-fourths (38) of the fifty state legislatures-would add to the United States Constitution similar
language which, in its crucial part, reads: "Equality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any state on account of sex." As of July 19, 1972, (the
124th anniversary of the 1848 Seneca Falls Women's Rights
Convention) twenty states had approved the federal amendment.
It will become effective two years after its ratification by the
requisite number of states.
The articles in this symposium examine the potential effects of
the state amendment upon selected areas of New Mexico law.
The New Mexico amendment was approved by the state
legislature and thus placed on the November ballot in the early
t Professor of Law, University of New Mexico (on leave 1972-73); Visiting Professor of Law,
University of California, Hastings College of The Law, 1972-73.
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part of 1972. At that time, the federal amendment had been
approved in the United States House of Representatives by the
necessary two-thirds vote. But, it seemed to be facing a difficult
fight in the United States Senate because of the determined
opposition of North Carolina's Sam Irvin among other United
States Senators. Contemplating this determined opposition to the
federal equal rights amendment and the possible seven-year
delay in its ratification, New Mexico equal rights proponents
concluded that immediate action was needed in New Mexico to
assure prompt rewriting of state laws which continue to make
arbitrary, biased, and harmful distinctions solely on the basis of
sex.
Since the approval of the state amendment by the New Mexico
legislature, the federal amendment has won approval in both
houses of Congress. Indeed, when the amendment finally came to
a vote in the United States Senate, the forecast opposition turned
out to be illusory; the amendment was approved by an overwhelming vote of eighty-four to eight. Within a month after
Senate approval, the legislatures of fifteen states had voted to
approve the amendment. And, as noted above, by July 19, 1972,
twenty states had approved the amendment, leaving only 18
more states required before it would become part of the United
States Constitution. Thus, it appears that, barring any unforeseen
complications, the federal amendment will be ratified long before
the seven-year limit within which it must pass or fail.
Because the federal amendment would prohibit official sex
discrimination not only at the federal level, but at the state level
as well, the question arises whether any purpose is to be served
by adopting a similar change in the New Mexico constitution. My
answer, which will be explained below, is an unqualified yes.
Many people, both lawyers and non-lawyers alike, may also ask
why any amendment is needed in the light of the recent United
States Supreme Court case of Reed v. Reed,' holding that a
particular state's sex-based discrimination violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause. The answer to that
question is found in the history of the movement for amending
both federal and state constitutions so as to guarantee equal
rights without regard to sex.
The widespread existence of separate rules of law for men and
1. 404U.S.71(1971).
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women solely on the basis of sex has been chronicled elsewhere.
Not only have such separate rules existed at common law, but
even under modern statutes they persist in many forms today.
Many of these are examined in the following articles of this
symposium.
Differences in the legal treatment accorded to men and women
as such have been the subject of attacks in a large number of
cases decided by the highest courts of the states as well as by the
United States Supreme Court itself. Most such attacks have been
based on assertions that particular sex-based distinctions in the
law violate individual sections of the United States and state
constitutions. The fate of such attacks-which, by and large, have
been unsuccessful-is detailed in an earlier article of mine
published in this law review. 3 But, for purposes of clarity, I would
like to summarize those failed attacks, and describe some recent
developments on the constitutional law front.
Prior to the 1970's, the United States Supreme Court had
decided a series of cases in which particular sex-discriminatory
rules or practices had been challenged on constitutional grounds.
Uniformly the Court held that each of the challenged sex-based
disparities were constitutionally permissible. In 1872, the court
decided in Bradwell v. The State4 that the privileges-and-immunities clauses of the United States Constitution did not prevent the
state of Illinois from denying women the right to be licensed as
attorneys in that state. In 1908, in the well-known case of Muller
v. Oregon,5 the court held that separate labor legislation for
women and men did not violate the due process guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In 1954, in Goesart v. Cleary,6 the court
upheld a Michigan law prohibiting women from serving as
bartenders in certain establishments, unless those establishments
were owned by the husbands or fathers of the women concerned.
And, in 1961, in Hoyt v. Florida,7 the court held that the equal
protection guarantee was not violated by a state provision under
which women, without regard to their marital status or family
situation, would not be required to serve on juries unless they
2. See, e.g. L. Kanowitz, Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution (1969).
3. Kanowitz. The Equal Rights Amendment and the Overtime Illusion, I N.M. L. Rev. 467
(1971).
4. 16 Wall. 130, 21 L.Ed. 442 (U.S. 1872).
5. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
6. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
7. 368U.S.57(1961).
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affirmatively indicated their desire to do so by registering with
the clerk of the court, a privilege that was not available to men
subject to jury service.
These and similar decisions at the state level caused equal
rights proponents to seek a constitutional amendment that would
specifically address the question of sex discrimination in the law.
Since 1923, efforts have been made in Congress toward the
adoption of such a constitutional amendment. Until this year,
such efforts have proved unsuccessful, partly as a result of the
unwillingness of crucial committee chairmen to hold hearings on
the proposed amendment. In 1971, however, approval of the
Equal Rights Amendment in Congress came closer than it ever
had before, and success was finally achieved in 1972.
The essential problem with the earlier challenges to sex-discriminatory laws and practices was the acceptance by the United
States Supreme Court of the principle that "sex is a reasonable
basis for classification." The court thus rationalized separate
treatment for men and women in a wide variety of situations
without considering whether the attributes of individual men and
women conformed to basic assumptions about the sexes generally. In the latter half of the 1960's, however, a series of decisions
by state courts and lower federal courts began to cast some doubt
upon the validity of that principle in particular situations. In
1966, a three-judge federal court in Alabama decided that the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
violated by a state's absolute denial to women of their right to
serve on juries.8 And in 1968 in United States ex rel. Robinson v.
York, 9 another federal court held that a state law requiring
longer prison terms for women than for men who were convicted
of the same crime also violated the equal protection guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
During this period, not all challenges to official sex-discrimination reached the same result. For example, a state court ruling
permitting husbands, but not wives, to sue for loss of consortium
as a result of injury negligently inflicted upon their spouses was
held not to violate the equal protection guarantee. 10 Similarly, a
three-judge federal court held that a state's maintenance of a
8. White v. Crook, 251 F.Supp. 401 (N.D. Ala. 1966).
9. 281 F.Supp. 8(D.Conn. 1968).
10. Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1066
(1969).
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women-only college to which men had been denied admission
because of their' sex, did not violate the equal protection
guarantee-again invoking the ancient shibboleth that "sex is a
reasonable basis for classification."" Interestingly, in each of the
last two cases, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Though this is not a disposition on the merits, the denials
indicated that the Court was going to choose carefully the case or
cases in which it would give its latest thinking on sex discrimination and the Constitution.
In 1971, the Court finally decided on the merits a case
attacking a particular species of sex discrimination as violating
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. In
that case, Reed v. Reed,'2 the court held an Idaho law preferring
males to females, as administrators of estates, did in fact violate
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Significantly, however, though the court was asked in the briefs
of the parties to hold that sex, like race, was a "suspect"
classification, therby requiring any state that would justify a
sex-based distinction to establish the necessity for such distinction
by "overwhelming" or "compelling" reasons, 13 the court failed to
enunciate this principle. Instead, Reed merely held that legislation which distinguished on the basis of sex would violate the
equal protection guarantee if the distinction was arbitrary and
unreasonable. Presumably, this meant that if there was any
rational basis for the distinction, it would be upheld-which is the
classic formula for testing state economic regulation against the
equal protection clause.
Though the United States Supreme Court has not categorically
rejected the suggestion that, for purposes of equal protection
review, a state's sex-based classification should be"suspect" like
its racial classifications, 14 a subsequent decision by the United
States Supreme Court casts much doubt on the Court's wilI1. Williams v. McNair, 316 F.Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
12. Supra note 1.
13. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 9 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92
(1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214. 216 (1944).
14. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Mr. Justice Brennan, in footnote 7 of his opinion,
made the following observations: "Of course, if we were to conclude that the Massachusetts
statute impinges upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold, the statutory classification would
have to be not merely rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the achievement
of a compelling state interest. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969): Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. I (1967). But just as in Reed v. Reed, supra, we do not have to address the statute's
validity under that test because the law fails to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection
standard."
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lingness to adopt that standard. In Forbush v. Wallace,15 a
three-judge federal court had, in the face of an equal protection
challenge, upheld Alabama's requirement that married women
be registered with that state's motor vehicle bureau by their
married names, and the state's common law rule requiring a
married woman to assume her husband's surname as her legal
name. Significantly, however, the three-judge court emphasized
the easy availability under Alabama law of a means to change a
married woman's name to some name other than her husband's
(a right that does not appear to exist for married women in many
other states). 16 The United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam
opinion, affirmed Forbush v. Wallace. Whether an affirmance
without opinion by the United States Supreme Court is of any
greater precedential value than a denial of certiorari is questionable. Equal rights proponents can still hope that the Court may in
the future be persuaded to reconsider the Forbush-type problem
and reach a different result.
Meanwhile the current posture of the United States Supreme
Court with respect to equal protection challenges against official
sex discrimination leaves much to be desired. Though, in Reed,
the court for the first time struck down on equal protection
grounds a state law which discriminated between the sexes, it
treated the problem like one in the economic sphere rather than
in the racial sphere as it had been urged to do. The court's
affirmance without opinion in Williams v. McNair17 and its
denial of certiorari in Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp.,18 also
suggest a go-slow attitude on its part. 19 Finally the court's
affirmance, albeit without opinion, in Forbush v. Wallace raises
serious questions about its willingness to recognize, insofar as
sex-based legal distinctions are concerned, the right of people to
be treated as individuals rather than simply as members of a
group whose general attributes do not necessarily correspond to
their own individual characteristics.
15. 341 F.Supp. 217 (D.C. Ala. 1971); aff'd 407 U.S. 970 (1972).
16. Supra note 2, at 43-45.
17. Supra note II.
18. Supra note 10.
19. See also Stanley v. Illinois, _
U.S. - , 92 S.Ct. 1208 (1972), deciding on due process
rather than equal protection grounds, that a father of an illegitimate child cannot be bypassed in
awarding custody of a child to strangers. Though the father in the case had urged a violation of
the equal protection clause because mothers of illegitimate children were not accorded this kind
of treatment, the court decided the case primarily as a due process violation because the child
could be taken from him without a hearing.
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Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to move in this area,
other courts have been less timid about applying the "suspect
classification" analysis to classifications based on sex. An early
case indicating a willingness to do this was the above-mentioned
case of Robinson v. York, although in that case the court did not
follow the logical implication of its theoretical construct to their
fullest extent. By contrast, the California Supreme Court, in the
landmark case of Sail'er Inn v. Kirby,20 has wholeheartedly
adopted the "suspect classification" analysis for classifications
based on sex, thereby invalidating that state's law prohibiting
women from serving as bartenders under certain circumstances.
Since the United Sates Supreme Court has often followed the
lead of the California Supreme Court in developing new
21
approaches to social and legal problems of the day, it is far
from certain that it will never adopt the "suspect classification"
rationale in the sex discrimination area, despite its demonstrated
reluctance to take that step.
The fact remains, however, that the Court, as of this writing,
has not adopted that analysis, and there is no guarantee that it
will do so. Even were it to do so, the suspect classification test
would not necessarily preclude classification based upon sex,
is a greater burden of justification for such a
since all it requires
22
classification.
For these reasons, equal rights proponents have insisted upon
the need for a constitutional amendment which (except in those
very rare and narrowly defined circumstances where discernible
sex-based biological differences clearly justify sex distinctions in
the law) would prohibit any official discrimination or distinction
based upon sex. It has been suggested that even under the Equal
Rights Amendment certain distinctions based upon sex, such as a
state's regulation of wet nurses and sperm donors, would
continue to be permissible. 23 The reason for this is that these
biological differences inhere in the very nature of the sexes. But if
20. 5 Cal.3d 1,485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
21. For a recent example, compare People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152 (1972) with Furman v. Georgia, 40 U.S.L.W. 4923 (1972).
22. But cf.Chief Justice Burger's recent observation: "Some lines must be drawn. To challenge
such lines by the 'compelling state interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as ! am aware,
no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will,
, 92 S.Ct.
U.S.
for it demands nothing less than perfection." Dunn v. Blumstein,
995. 1013 (1972) (dissent).

23. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 Yale LJ. 871, 893 (1971).
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a state attempts to distinguish between the sexes merely on the
basis of statistical probability or widespread generalization, it
would violate the equal rights principle.
Thus, if and when the Equal Rights Amendment becomes part
of the United States Constitution, it is clear, from its legislative
history, that any state or federal distinction based upon sex,
which is not inextricably linked to the biological characteristics of
men and women and which does not exist in all men and all
women, would be invalid. At the same time, it is clear that the
Amendment would permit many individual men and women to
continue to receive the same legal treatment they receive now.
But such treatment would be accorded them because of their
individual circumstances, and not because of any assumptions
about them based on their sex. Because the language of New
Mexico's equal rights amendment tracks that of the federal equal
rights amendment it is equally clear that its interpretation would
be comparable.
Why, then, is there any need for an amendment to the state
constitution? For one thing, it is by no means certain that the
federal Equal Rights Amendment would be ratified in the very
near future-although at this writing, it seems likely that ratification will occur well within the seven-year period required under
the -congressional resolution sending the measure to the states.
Should ratification of the federal amendment be delayed, the
adoption of the New Mexico amendment would insure that, in
New Mexico at least, the equal rights principle would be quickly
implemented. (It is worth noting that equal rights amendments to
state constitutions will be before the electorate of various other
states in November, 1972, including Texas and Colorado.
Pennsylvania adopted a similar state amendment in 1971.)24
There is, moreover, another important difference between the
federal amendment and that proposed for New Mexico. As
mentioned earlier, the federal amendment would not go into
effect until two years after its ratification. This delay was
designed by Congress to give the states adequate opportunity to
revise their own laws so as to implement the equal right principle
enunciated in the amendment. Above all, Congress was concerned that any disparities based upon sex under state law should be
24. Pa. Const. art. 1. §27 reads: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual." Adopted
May 18. 1971.
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corrected in the first instance by the legislative representatives of
the states themselves, rather than by federal or state courts. By
contrast, the New Mexico amendment, if approved by voters in
November of 1972, would go into effect by July 1973, a delay of
approximately seven months. As this symposium demonstrates,
however, the shorter delay in the effective date for the New
Mexico amendment should not seriously impede the ability of
the New Mexico legislature to enact implementing legislation in
the forthcoming 1973 session. In addition to the materials of this
symposium, a committee of New Mexico Law School students,
both male and female, has prepared a comprehensive memorandum suggesting alternative ways of curing present sex-based
inequalities under New Mexico law, evaluating those alternatives, and recommending one or more approaches in a variety of
25
fields.
But perhaps more important than the possibilities of earlier
action under the state amendment than under the federal
amendment is the symbolic significance of what many of us hope
will be the positive approval of New Mexico voters this November. In contrast to the ratification process for the federal
amendment, which requires action by state legislatures, the New
Mexico amendment would require approval by a popular vote of
ordinary New Mexican voters in an ordinary election. In some
ways, this resembles the recent approval in Switzerland of
women's right to vote in that country's federal elections. Though,
in some respects, it was at best a minor accomplishment for the
Swiss to approve this basic human right, it is significant that
approval finally came by a popular vote of that country's male
voters.
Ratification of the state Equal Rights Amendment by New
Mexico voters would, therefore, be understood as an unequivocal
commitment by ordinary men and women in our state to the
ideal of equal treatment without regard to sex, and to the
concomitant ideal that people ought to be treated in law and
society as individual human beings and not merely as members
of a "class" to which they might belong but whose general
characteristics may or may not conform to their individual
attributes.
All signs point to a positive vote on the state Equal Rights
25. See A Report on Possible Effects of the Equal Rights Amendment (April 5. 1972).
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Amendment this November. Diverse organizations such as the
League of Women Voters, the Business and Professional Women's Association, the Communications Workers of America and
other labor organizations, student groups at the University of
New Mexico and throughout the state, among others, have
already voiced their approval and support of the state
amendment.
The important point to keep in mind is that we are entering a
new era in American life insofar as the legal and social status of
the sexes are concerned. Older assumptions, unproven by fact or
experience, concerning the general characteristics of men and
women are being challenged because of the injustices they have
caused to both sexes in our society. In numerous areas of
contemporary life, a reevaluation of past practices and concepts
is under way. Adoption of the state Equal Rights Amendment,
along with the federal Equal Rights Amendment, will represent
law's contribution to such a reevaluation.

